One, of several, regulatory responses to the financial crisis has been to consider the extent to which bank failure can be explained by flaws in banks' corporate governance arrangements (Kirkpatrick (2009); Walker (2009) ). Attention has been paid in particular to the relationship between board independence and bank failure (Adams (2012) ; Beltratti and Stulz (2012) ; Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2010) ). Limited attention has been given to the relationship between bank failure and core corporate governance rules that determine the ease with which shareholders can remove and replace management (Bruner (2011) ; Laeven and Levine (2009) ). In this paper we examine the role played by such rules in mediating the different incentives of shareholders and bank managers, and the effect that such rules have on the probability of bank bailouts. This paper has two main contributions. The first one is the proposal of a measure of the extent to which corporate managers are insulated from shareholder pressure. Many corporate governance indices first identify a set of relevant legal rules and governance provisions and then award scores based on the existence or absence of these legal arrangements (La Porta et al (1998) ; La Porta et al (2006) ; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) ; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) ). This way of indexing, however, ignores the fact that certain governance arrangements can be rendered functionally irrelevant by the presence or absence of other rules. As the absence or existence of an irrelevant governance provision still has an impact on the final score, it adds noise to the final index values. The inclusion of governance provisions that as a result of other legal provisions are rendered functionally irrelevant also means that similar index scores do not necessarily represent similar outcomes.
Our measure, which we call the management insulation index (MII), takes a different route.
Instead of linear indexing, the MII is what could be called a contingent index. Drawing on the prior work of Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) on effective staggered boards, we systematically assess the interaction between different legal rules on the allocation of power between shareholders and managers within corporations, also taking into account the significant differences in state corporate laws across the US. After filtering out the governance arrangements most relevant to our research question, we identify six combinations of governance arrangements that can theoretically be considered distinct. Most of our index values are the result of different (but functionally equivalent) corporate governance arrangements. We detail the construction of the index in Section 1.
There are two main advantages of the MII in our setting. First, the MII has a more natural interpretation than that of most alternative indices. Second, because of our contingent approach to the construction of the index, we expect the MII to be less affected by measurement errors. This is particularly important in small-sample settings. This conjecture is supported by our evidence.
Our second and main contribution is to apply this index to show that banks with less insulated managers were more likely to receive capital injections under the Capital Purchase Program We find that measures of management insulation in 2003 are robust predictors of bank bailouts in 2008-09. This result is economically and statistically strong, despite the relatively small size of our sample. Our most conservative estimate suggests that banks with the highest management insulation scores were 18 percentage points less likely to be bailed out than banks with the lowest insulation scores. Such a result cannot be replicated with alternative measures of shareholder influence, such as ownership concentration, board independence, and board classification. Thus, the MII appears to contain information that is not captured by these other governance variables.
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that governance arrangements in charters, by-laws and state corporate laws are very persistent, and thus the governance provisions in place in 2003 still have significant forecasting power for bank outcomes in 2008-09. To account for the possibility of omitted persistent factors, we saturate the empirical model with a number of bank characteristics. In particular, we use a flexible specification for bank size and include state dummies, as size and state effects are likely to be strong predictors of bailouts. We find that, in models with more covariates, the marginal effects of managerial insulation on bailouts tend to be stronger. Such a pattern suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to explain our findings.
The fact that governance arrangements in 2003 predict future bailouts does not imply causality. But the failure of most observable bank characteristics to predict bailouts suggests that omitted variables are unlikely to be the answer. Furthermore, we also find that banks in which the management insulation index was reduced between 2003 and 2006 are more likely to be bailed out, which suggests that the evidence cannot be fully explained by fixed bank characteristics. Reverse causality stories are also not very plausible given the significant time lag between predictor and predicted variables.
To investigate the mechanism further, we perform a number of additional tests that are aimed at differentiating between alternative hypotheses. We consider three leading interpretations of the evidence, all of which are interesting. The first one is the possibility that bank participation in the CPP is correlated with a bank's need to recapitalize after finding itself in a fragile position during the crisis. Consistent with this view, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) show that weaker banks were more likely to apply for CPP equity injections than stronger banks were. Similarly, Taliaferro (2009) shows that banks with exposure to troubled asset classes were more likely to participate in the CPP. Thus, one interpretation of our evidence is that shareholder empowerment leads to decisions that make banks weaker and less able to weather crises.
A second possibility is the exact opposite of the first story: perhaps those banks with high management insulation scores were so weak that they did not qualify for government support. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) analyze in detail the criteria for selecting CPP participants. Many measures of bank strength were considered as a pre-requisite for government investment. If banks with high management insulation scores were badly run, they may have been among those banks that had their CPP applications rejected.
A third interpretation is as follows. As CPP equity injections can be seen as a source of cheap capital, a decision not to participate in the CPP may be a symptom of poor governance. CPP participation came with strings attached, such as restrictions on executive compensation. It is possible that powerful executives would prefer not to participate. Cadman, Carter and Lynch (2012) show evidence that compensation restrictions affected TARP participation. Thus, perhaps when banks are offered the opportunity to recapitalize cheaply, only the wellgoverned ones do so.
The first two stories are mutually exclusive. To address them, we modify our bailout variable in the following way. We identify those banks that plausibly did not participate in CPP because they were too weak, and treat them as if they had been bailed out. We find that the link between the MII variable and the bailout indicator becomes stronger. This finding strengthens the first interpretation: shareholder empowerment and bank strength at the beginning of the crisis seem to be negatively associated. We also show that banks with high MII were more likely to refuse CPP funds after the investment was approved. This evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that high MII banks did not receive funds because they were weak. The balance of the evidence thus rejects the second story.
This leaves us with the first and third stories, which are not mutually exclusive. Both stories are plausible. Although we cannot perfectly discriminate between them, we offer some additional evidence that they are not equally supported by the data. To address the third story, we first identify those banks that did not apply for funds, or that received CPP funds but repaid them early (before the end of 2009). The latter banks chose to replace cheap government capital with more expensive private capital. In particular, banks that exited CPP redeemed preferred shares at par, while the fair value of those shares was below par (Wilson and Wu (2012) ). Thus, similarly to the decision not to participate, exiting CPP early could be a symptom of bad governance. However, we find that the link between the MII and CPP application (either including or excluding early-repayment banks) is both economically and statistically weak. This evidence is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that the negative relation between the MII and bailouts is mainly due to management's desire not to be bound by the CPP restrictions.
Why would banks with more empowered shareholders be more likely to be bailed out in a banking crisis? One possibility is that governance arrangements influence the extent to which bank managers give effect to equity's risk preferences. As a result of uncosted implicit and explicit government guarantees diversified bank shareholders may be incentivized to take excessive risks. There are two reasons for this. First, these state guarantees mean that bank creditors do not discipline equity's risk shifting incentives (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ).
Second, there is evidence that in the event of a banking crisis these guarantees make equity safer. Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2012) provide evidence that government guarantees to the financial sector have positive spillover effects on equity holders, and also that the implicit bailout promises are priced in the market. Equity holders may thus have incentives to take risks that are correlated with the state of the banking sector. It may be that in banks in which shareholders are less empowered and therefore less influential executives may have more scope to give effect to their own risk preferences which, due to the less diversified nature of their human capital investments, are less risk-friendly than those of shareholders.
To investigate this possibility, we estimate the effects of management insulation on two additional variables. The first variable is the proportion of non-interest income in total bank income. Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012) present evidence that banks with higher noninterest income contribute more to systemic risk than banks that focus more on deposit taking and lending. We show that banks with high levels of management insulation in 2003 were less likely to increase their non-interest income ratios in the years prior to the crisis (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . The second variable is the proportion of Level 3 assets in total assets, which is a measure of asset quality (Riedl and Serafeim (2011) ). Level 3 assets are illiquid complex securities. We find that banks whose governance arrangements insulated them from managerial pressure were likely to have a lower proportion of Level 3 assets in 2008 than banks that were not as insulated.
Overall, the evidence suggests that bank holding companies with empowered shareholders were more likely to be bailed out partly because they engaged in non-traditional banking activities, such as investment banking and trading of complex securities. Such activities are plausible sources of correlated risks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 presents the management insulation index and explains its construction. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 presents summary statistics. The main empirical results are then presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The Management Insulation Index
In order to assess the level of managerial insulation of the banks in our sample, we design a corporate governance index. The management insulation index (MII) aims at measuring, in an objective way, the degree of managers' exposure to potential strategic intervention by activist shareholders. index). 4 The second distinctive aspect is that many of the core corporate law rules, including shareholder rights to remove directors and call shareholder meetings, are optional. This contrasts with other common and civil law jurisdictions such as the UK and Germany, where such rights are mandatory. It follows that in order to determine how exposed managers are to activist shareholder threats and pressure, we cannot simply consider the mandatory and default corporate law rules of the state of the bank's incorporation, but need to look at those rules in combination with an analysis of the bank's constitutional documents, its charter and by-laws.
Background and Elements of the MII
Given this variation in banks' shareholder rights and, as a corollary, managerial insulation, to understand the state of shareholder empowerment and its effects, we need a way of systematically assessing this variation in shareholder rights. The objective of the MII is to systematize this variation in relation to the sub-set of rights which shareholders can use to oust management, or -perhaps more importantly -credibly threaten to do so. It is not our aim to create a general corporate governance or shareholder rights index; we exclusively focus on answering the question of how core corporate law rules make it more or less difficult and time-consuming (and hence costly) to challenge incumbent management.
We analyze the availability to shareholders of different legal strategies aimed at replacing existing management under the applicable state law and the constitutional documents in force at the relevant time. A determined and coordinated shareholder body can, in all US jurisdictions, ultimately decide on the composition of the board. The differences we identify mainly focus on the speed and level of coordination necessary to achieve a change in management. The underlying assumption is that time plays an important de facto role in insulating managers, as the financial return of shareholder intervention required by activist investors will crucially depend on the time horizon of such pay-off.
The typical linear corporate governance indices first identify a set of relevant legal rules and governance provisions and then award scores based on the existence or absence of these legal arrangements (La Porta et al (1998); La Porta et al (2006); Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) ; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) ). This way of indexing, however, ignores the fact that certain governance arrangements can be rendered functionally irrelevant by the presence or absence of other rules and, in particular, that the appearance of insulation created by the presence of a staggered board may be misleading when other governance variables are taken into account (Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian (2002) companies, are typically far less exposed to the market for corporate control as the opacity of their balance sheets as well as regulatory hurdles provide for significant protection from "disciplining" hostile takeovers (Levine (2004) ).
Third, shareholders can elect additional directors to the board and thereby outnumber the incumbent directors. The availability of this option again depends on the provisions in the charter and by-laws of each corporation and the number of appointed directors: Shareholders must first have the right to increase the size of the current board, which differs from bank to bank. This depends on the provisions of the charter and by-laws, as well as on the state default rules. Moreover, if the charter provides for a maximum board size (as it often does), this maximum number must be large enough for the newly appointed directors to be able to outnumber the existing board members. In banks with classified boards, this means that the maximum board size has to be greater by at least a third than the current board size. Together with the third of directors elected annually, this allows shareholders to increase board size to the maximum and fill the vacancies created by the expiring directorships to gain (at least) 50% of the board seats.
Fourth, shareholders in corporations with both classified and unclassified boards sometimes (typically in the case of unclassified boards) have the right to simply remove directors "without cause".
The chart below (Figure 1 ) shows the different "paths" leading to each of our six outcomes.
-Insert Figure 1 about here -
We check the availability of each of the above governance arrangements for all banks in our sample. Moreover, we also check whether shareholders need to wait for an annual stockholder meeting to exercise their control rights. This is the case where shareholders neither have the right to call a special (interim) meeting, 8 nor may "act by written consent".
The latter right, available in some corporations, allows shareholders to solicit written consent 8 Where shareholders do not have to wait for an annual stockholder meeting to exercise their rights, we also have to adjust our calculations of the "increase board size"-strategy. As directors' terms are unaffected by the holding of a special meeting, we compare the actual board size with the maximum board size. To illustrate this point, take a corporation with a maximum board size of 21, and an actual board size of 12. While shareholders could gain control over the board in an annual meeting (where the terms of 4 directors expire, and shareholders thus can elect a total of 13 directors), this is not true in a special meeting (where only 9 available seats could be filled, leaving the current board in control). Where, as in the above example, control can only be obtained by increasing board size coupled with the replacement of the directors whose term expires, banks can only be classified as MII 3 or 4 regardless of the existence of a right to call a special meeting.
statements from other shareholders and effect decisions within the powers of the general meeting without actually holding a meeting.
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This allows us to form three groups of banks where shareholders can, in theory, gain control over the bank's board almost immediately (MII scores of 1 and 2), within a one year (one meeting) timeframe (MII scores of 3 and 4), or after a two year (two meeting) timeframe (MII scores of 5 and 6). Note that the extent of the managerial insulation in categories 3, 4, 5 and 6 varies during the year as a function of the length of time to the next annual general meeting. This variation is particular pronounced in relation to categories 3 and 4 where the timing of the general meeting can vary the insulated time period from between virtually no time lag to up to one year. In the Appendix, we describe each index value in detail and the "paths" leading to these values.
Data
Our initial sample consists of 476 US based commercial banks that were publicly listed in on the specific governance provisions we identified when constructing the management insulation index (see the detailed description in Section 1).
We obtain bank financial data from Worldscope. We use book assets as proxies for bank size, and we measure leverage as assets over common equity. We collect detailed investor level ownership data from Bankscope and compensation data for the highest paid director from CapitalIQ. We also construct a variable that counts the number of bank acquisitions between 2003 and 2006. We only include those transactions in which the acquirer achieved full control by acquiring at least 50% of the target. For this we use the entire M&A database from
Thomson One Banker, and match the acquirer's name against the bank names in our initial database per year. We match the acquisitions of subsidiaries to the parent company. We construct a banking experience indicator variable that equals one if the director had a prior managerial or top-executive position in any bank, and an independence variable based on whether a bank director is declared independent. We adjust the independence variable for a number of dimensions such as prior employment and material client relationship.
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Management Insulation Scores: Summary Statistics
We assign a score of 1 to 6 to each bank-year from 2003 to 2007, according to the procedure described in Figure 1 . Table I shows the number of observations in each group. Figure 2 shows the frequency of each group per year. We find that most banks are either in group 2 (about 28%) or in group 6 (about 32%). Groups 1 and 4 are also significant (about 15% each), but group 3 and 5 are both fairly uncommon. The distribution of management 10 For an extensive description of the adjustment process, see Ferreira, Kirchmaier, and Metzger (2010) .
insulation scores is very stable over the years. The reason for this stability is the fact that the governance provisions that are used in the construction of the index are rarely modified. In some cases, these provisions have been in place for decades. This feature is useful for our empirical strategy.
-Insert Table I about here --Insert Figure 2 about hereHow should we aggregate these data? A typical procedure is simply to assign a score of 1 to 6
to each of these categories. We define such a variable as the management insulation index (MII). However, there is no a priori reason to assume that all categories are equally important. In fact, we believe that groups 5 and 6 represent a level of management insulation that is vastly stronger than all the other levels. Thus, we also create an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the management insulation index is equal to five or six, otherwise it is zero. We call this variable the management insulation dummy (MID) . This variable has a straightforward interpretation: it indicates those banks for which it would take two consecutive shareholder meetings for a majority coalition of shareholders to gain control of the board. In unreported results, we also considered alternative ways of grouping the management insulation variables. These variations have no important consequences for our conclusions. Table II shows the cross-sectional averages of the MII and MID variables per year. It also shows the average of a classified board dummy (CBD) variable. If we consider board classification (i.e. the existence of a staggered board) as a measure of managerial entrenchment, we note that, compared to our management insulation dummy, the classified board dummy substantially overestimates the extent to which managers are entrenched.
While 77% of the boards in our sample are classified in 2003, in only 38% of the banks managers are substantially insulated from shareholder pressure, according to our measure.
The MID variable thus paints a very different picture of management insulation in banks from the one suggested by the CBD variable.
-Insert Table II about here -We expect the MID variable to contain different information than that in the CBD. Table III shows the percentage of banks that have classified boards, but do not have a management insulation index of 5 or 6. Just below 40% of all banks have classified boards and their managers are not fully insulated. In fact, it is possible for banks with classified boards to achieve very low scores of management insulation. For example, in 2007, 16% of the classified-board banks had a management insulation index of 1 and 19.5% of such banks had a management insulation index of 2 (results not tabulated).
-Insert Table III about here - Table IV presents the summary statistics of the main variables used in our empirical analysis in Section 4. The unit of observation is a bank-year, thus the maximum sample size is 1267.
Some variables are however only available for some years. We see from Table IV that about 56% of the banks in the sample received CPP funds.
-Insert Table IV about here - Table V All the other characteristics are very similar across the two groups.
-Insert Table V about here -
Empirical Results
Our goal in this section is to estimate the probability that a bank is bailed out, which is measured by the bank's participation in the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) in 2008-2009. To investigate the role of bank characteristics on the probability of bailouts, we estimate the following model:
where is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if bank i has received CPP funds, is a vector of lagged bank characteristics (as of 2006 or earlier), is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and is a the standardized normal cumulative distribution function (i.e. a Probit model). We do not report the estimates for the vector ; instead, we always report estimated marginal effects evaluated at the means of the data. This means that the reported estimates can be readily interpreted and compared. Our results are not sensitive to the Probit specification.
Our main right-hand side variable of interest is the management insulation dummy (MID). As we discuss above, the maximum level of insulation (MII=5 or MII=6) is likely to offer substantially more protection to managers than all the other levels. As further indication of the salience of that insulation level, we note that 38% of the banks in our sample have MII=5 Because of the small size of the sample, we choose a parsimonious set of covariates to be included in . It is well known that larger banks are more likely to be bailed out (the "too big to fail" effect), thus it is important to control properly for size. We use (the natural logarithm of) the book value of assets as a proxy for size. In order to give more functional-form flexibility to the effect of size on bailouts, we run spline regressions in which the effect of size on bailouts is allowed to differ according to whether the value of the assets is in one of the following three groups: the bottom sextile (the 6-quantile) of the sample, the top sextile, or between these two. As it will become clear, this particular specification has no important effect on the results.
Alongside size, in our baseline specification we also include leverage. The reason for including leverage is clear: highly-levered banks are more likely to require bailing out.
Importantly, we include dummies for the bank's state of incorporation in some of the regressions (there are banks from 38 states in our sample). We want to make sure that our results are not simply an artifact of differences in corporate law across states.
Main Results
In Table VI In column (b) we add a first set of controls: size variables and leverage. The effect of the MID is basically unchanged. We find that larger banks are indeed more likely to be bailed out. The estimated slopes are roughly similar across the three size groups. Indeed, the results are basically identical in (unreported) regressions in which size is broken down into a different number of groups (either more or fewer groups). Leverage appears to be positively related to bailouts. In column (c) we add state dummies. The number of observations is reduced because there are ten states with just one bank in the sample. Despite the loss of pure cross-state variation, all estimated effects remain roughly unchanged. The statistical precision of the estimates falls due to a dramatic reduction in degrees of freedom, but still remains at adequate levels.
In column (d) we include an additional set of control variables: board independence (as a proportion of board size), the proportion of independent directors with previous banking experience, a 20% block ownership dummy, the ownership stake of the insider with the largest interest in the bank, the number of acquisitions from 2003 to 2006, the fraction of variable pay over the total compensation for the highest paid director (which is typically the CEO), and (the natural logarithm of) the total compensation for the highest paid director. The effect of management insulation on the probability of bailouts is virtually unchanged in this specification: banks with insulated managers are 22 percentage points less likely to be bailed out. Regarding the other control variables, we note that the effect of leverage is now larger and statistically stronger. The number of acquisitions appears to be positively related to bailouts. The number of acquisitions is strongly correlated with bank size, and we cannot rule out the possibility that its positive effect on bailouts is simply a consequence of the too big to fail effect. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that the inclusion of the acquisition variable reduces the statistical precision of the size variables (this is also verified in unreported regressions).
Our preliminary conclusion is that the management insulation dummy is a robust predictor of bank bailouts. Its predictive power is not diminished by the inclusion of alternative governance variables, such as the presence of large block holders, board independence, board experience, and compensation variables. Saturating the model with covariates and state dummies has virtually no effect on the estimated marginal effects of management insulation.
It is important to clarify our interpretation of these results. There are a few cases of major changes, such as from 1 to 6 and from 6 to 2 (see Table IV ).
Column (e) of Table VI reports the results of a regression using the same specification as in column (d), but now including the change in MII as another right-hand side variable. We first note that the inclusion of this variable increases the point estimate of the marginal effect of MID. In this specification, banks with insulated managers are 26.5 percentage points less likely to be bailed out. This effect also appears to be more statistically precise, at roughly 2.57 standard errors from zero. We also find that the change in MII has a strong effect on the probability of bailouts: a one-point reduction in the index increases the probability of a bailout by roughly 13 percentage points. This effect is statistically precise, with a z-statistic of -2.1.
We conclude that recent changes in the management insulation index from 2003 to 2006 contain information that helps explain the cross-section of bank bailouts. This information goes beyond that contained in the management insulation dummy in 2003.
Robustness
We now discuss some additional robustness checks and offer some more interpretation.
Although it is impossible to rule out omitted variables as an explanation for our findings, the pattern of estimated marginal effects as more controls are added is reassuring. In virtually all cases in Table VI , the inclusion of additional controls tends to make the results stronger (in an economic, not statistical sense). Because controls do not seem to make the estimated effects weaker, it seems unlikely that by simply adding more controls one could eventually find the key missing variable. For omitted variables to explain away the effect of the MID variable, we would need to find additional variables that are weakly correlated with the controls included in the specifications in Table VI . For example, suppose that we thought that bank size could explain the effect of the MID. Our flexible specification for bank size is surely still quite imperfect, thus one could make a case for adding more and better proxies for size. However, one would need to find an alternative size variable that is only weakly correlated with book assets, but strongly correlated with the MID variable. In other words, the common factor between such a variable and the MID must be different than the common factor among all size variables.
Substantial research exists on the role of classified boards (also known as staggered boards) in entrenching managers. 11 According to our management insulation index, however, a classified board is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a firm achieving the maximum score of management insulation. In fact, it is even possible for a firm with a classified board to achieve the lowest score of management insulation. In 2003, 39.2% of the banks with classified boards had a management insulation index below 5. Still, given the high correlation between the MID variable and the board classification dummy, a question arises of whether our index is nothing more than a proxy for the simpler board classification dummy.
In Table VII , we report the output of regressions with the same specifications as those in columns (a)-(d) of Table VI , but we now replace the MID variable with the board classification dummy. We find that, even after dropping the MID variable from the regression, the marginal effects of the classified board variable are both economically and statistically insignificant, with the exception of the univariate specification (column (a)),
where the estimated coefficient is borderline significant.
-Insert (2010)). In particular, a positive relation between board independence and bank bailouts is found in Adams (2012) and Minton, Taillard, and Williamson (2010) . As we see from Table VI , the effect of board independence on the probability of bailouts is small and statistically insignificant. We conjecture that board independence is a noisy proxy for shareholder empowerment. As such, its effect in our sample is likely to be small, either because our sample is small or because the management insulation dummy is a more precise proxy for (less) shareholder empowerment, or both.
Investigating the Mechanism
As discussed in the introduction, there are three leading explanations for the negative relation between management insulation and the probability of bailouts. First, management insulation may be correlated with decisions that made banks stronger during the crisis, leading to fewer bailouts. Second, management insulation may be correlated with decisions that made banks weaker during the crisis, and because of such weakness, such banks did not qualify for CPP investments. Third, insulated managers may have chosen not to apply for bailout funds. Here we investigate each of these explanations in turn to see whether they survive further scrutiny.
Management Insulation and Bank Performance
Banks with serious liquidity needs had no option but to apply for CPP funds. However, participation in CPP is a less reliable indicator of bank performance during the crisis where reasons other than financial necessity played a role in banks' decisions to accept a bailout. A particular concern is that large banks that were considered systemically important by government regulators may have had little choice but to accept CPP funds, regardless of whether managers felt that their institutions needed a bailout. To address this concern, column (a) of Table VIII If managers of strong banks, due to pressure from the regulator or otherwise, accepted CPP funds, such managers were incentivized to exit CPP as early as possible in order to avoid the restrictions on executive compensation linked to CPP participation (Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012)). Accordingly, omitting banks that took and repaid CPP funds within a year following the commencement of the program is likely to exclude from our sample many of the banks that took CPP funds for reasons other than financial necessity.
In column (b) of Table VIII , we report the output of regressions excluding banks that repaid early. Finally in column (c) of Table VIII we exclude both of these groups. Following the exclusion of both these groups the MID remains a robust predictor of bailouts. In additional unreported regressions we group the banks that repaid early together with the banks that did not receive any CPP funds; this regrouping has no significant impact on our results.
-Insert Table VIII about hereNote also that the membership in the two groups excluded in (a) and (b) is highly correlated:
50% of the largest sextile of our sample banks had entirely repaid the received CPP funds by October 2009, while only roughly 10% of the remaining banks had done so. This also supports the hypothesis that some of the largest institutions in our sample participated in CPP because of their systemic importance and not because of financial necessity.
Furthermore, some banks which had serious liquidity difficulties did not qualify for CPP capital injections or had their applications rejected because they were too weak (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, (2012) ; Duchin and Sosyura, (2012)). Our bailout indicator is at best a noisy proxy for performance/liquidity needs, because some of the worst-performing banks did not receive CPP funds.
To address the concern that our bailout dummy is a poor proxy for bank weakness, or perhaps worse, that it might be a proxy for bank strength, we first identify those banks that did not receive funds because they were too weak. These are banks that were closed by the FDIC shortly after the CPP was announced, or banks that stated that they could not issue preferred shares because they had already defaulted/delayed payment on subordinated debt, or there were other clear reasons for not receiving funds due to weakness. There are 14 banks in this category. We also identify 8 banks that did not receive funds and subsequently failed (as of 2010). We then create two new indicator variables. The first one, which we call "bailout + weak bank dummy," is equal to 1 if a bank either is bailed out or is weak but is not bailed out. The second variable, which we call "bailout + weak + failed banks," is equal to the first one except that it also includes the failed banks in the group of bailed out and weak banks.
These two new variables are arguably less noisy proxies for poor performance.
In Table IX , columns (a) and (b), we report the output of regressions using the same specification as in column (e) of Table VI (which is the one with the largest set of controls), but replacing the bailout variable with these two different indicator variables. We find that the results become stronger. Now those banks with MID=1 are about 33 to 35 percentage points less likely to be poor performers.
-Insert Table IX about hereAs these results are directly comparable to those from Table VI, the evidence here supports an interpretation in which management insulation may have made some banks stronger.
Management Insulation and Incentives to Apply for CPP funds
The negative relation between management insulation and the acceptance of CPP funds could be explained by badly-governed banks choosing not to apply for these funds. In that case, we expect the negative relation between management insulation and the decision to apply for CPP funds to be even stronger than that between management insulation and bailouts. To test this hypothesis, we create an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank applied for CPP funds. We assume that all banks that received CPP funds applied for them. Of the remaining banks, we identify 34 banks that did apply for the funds, but did not get them. This information comes from the banks' company reports, such as 10-Ks, annual reports, or documents on their web pages.
From Table IX , column (c), we see that the MID variable has a negative effect on the probability of applying for funds. This effect is, however, economically smaller than that of the bailout variable and is statistically imprecise. Empirically, this result is explained by the fact that a large number of banks that applied for CPP funds, but did not get them, had the highest insulation scores (MII=5 or 6). This evidence is difficult to reconcile with an interpretation in which badly-governed banks choose not to apply for bailout funds.
Some banks that received CPP funds exited from the program very early. An early exit could also be a symptom of bad governance. Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) show evidence that banks with high levels of CEO compensation were more likely to exit CPP early. Wilson and Wu (2012) argue that there was no compelling economic reason to repay CPP investments
early, leaving open the possibility that badly-governed banks chose to exit the program against the interests of their shareholders. To address this possibility, we identify 23 banks that received CPP funds but repaid these funds at or before October 2009. We use this information to refine our CPP application dummy, which now classifies those banks that exited early in the same group as those that did not apply. We report the results in Table IX, column (d). The estimated effect of the MID variable on the probability of applying for funds and not repaying them early is economically weaker than that reported in column (c), and its statistical precision is weak.
Management Insulation and Rejection of CPP funds
The strong correlation between management insulation and the probability of receiving CPP is not fully explained by the decision to apply for CPP funds. Thus, it is likely that some banks with MID=1 applied for CPP funds, but did not get them. There are two main reasons for a bank not to receive CPP funds, conditional on applying for such funds. As discussed above, some banks were too weak to qualify for such funds. But we already know from column (a) that MID=1 banks were less likely to be denied funds because they were weak.
Alternatively, some banks had their applications approved, but rejected the CPP investments.
The latter banks were relatively strong, as evidenced by the approval of funds and the fact that they believed that they could go on without such funds.
In column (e) of Table IX we estimate the probability of rejecting CPP funds, conditional on approval. The sample is restricted to those banks that had their applications approved. We find that banks with MID=1 are 27.6 percentage points more likely to reject CPP funds after approval. This result again casts doubt on the hypothesis that banks with insulated managers did not receive funds because they were weak. However, the regression in column (e) is not able to separate between the main two competing hypotheses (the first story and the third story), as rejecting CPP funds may not only be an indicator of strength, but also a symptom of bad governance.
Overall, the evidence in Table IX is quite compelling. The negative correlation between management insulation and bailouts is mostly driven by a combination of low-insulation banks being weak, and thus not receiving CPP funds (columns (a) and (b)), and highinsulation banks being sufficiently strong to reject CPP funds (column (e)). On the other hand, the decision to apply for CPP funds explains only a small part of the results. We conclude that the data support the hypothesis that management insulation is correlated with decisions that made banks stronger during the crisis. There is very little support for the alternative hypothesis that the management insulation index works as a proxy for badlygoverned banks that choose not to raise cheap government capital.
Bank Scope: Income and Asset Composition
If management insulation is related to different choices in the period before the crisis, what are these choices? Here we investigate the relation between management insulation and some accounting variables that might be informative about bank choices prior to the crisis.
Using accounting data to assess pre-CPP bank strength is problematic. Accounting data such as leverage ratios are likely to be an opaque and noisy measure of the risk of a bank's asset profile, as such ratios are not informative about the risk attributes of the asset portfolio itself.
Likewise, even risk-based capital ratios as measures of bank strength or solvency are similarly opaque and noisy due to their regulatory use, 12 and because their calculation, precrisis, was based on assumptions that were proven incorrect by the ensuing financial crisis. In unreported regressions, we find only weak evidence of associations between management insulation and traditional proxies for risk and performance, such as leverage, accounting performance, stock market performance, non-performing loans, and measures of volatility prior to the crisis. our Table IV and Brunnermeier et al's Figure 1 ).
In Table X 
We use the same variables as before as covariates. The size of the sample falls because of missing data. We find that banks with the highest management insulation scores (MID=1) experienced larger reductions in their non-interest ratios than those banks with low management insulation scores. To understand the economic significance of these results, consider for example the point estimate of -0.21 in the first row of column (a) ( Table X) . This coefficient roughly means that, compared to an otherwise identical low-insulation bank with 14 The literature on TARP offers some contradictory evidence on the relation between bailouts and bank performance. For example, Ng, Vasvari, and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) show that banks that participated in the CPP experienced lower stock returns relative to nonparticipants during the CPP initiation period. However, CPP participants appeared to have stronger fundamentals than nonparticipants. The authors interpret this finding as evidence that the market irrationally perceived CPP participation as bad news. However, it is also possible to reinterpret these findings as consistent with a view in which accounting data from banks are noisy, and that the market learns about important soft information from CPP participation. As troubled banks indeed improve after receiving CPP funds, eventually their valuations go back in line with those of nonparticipants.
no change in its non-interest income ratio, a high-insulation bank would have decreased its non-interest income ratio by 21%. From Table IV than banks with MID=0 (see column (a)). This effect is economically strong: the average percentage of L3 assets in our sample is 0.56% and the standard deviation is 1.26% (see Table IV ). One caveat here is that about half of the banks used in column (a) had no L3 assets -Insert Table XI about here -
The evidence in this subsection is only suggestive, thus our conclusions are tentative. Banks with high management insulation scores appear to have been focused more on traditional commercial banking activities (deposit taking and lending) than those banks with low management insulation scores. Such a difference in the scope of bank activities is reflected in the different levels of non-interest income ratios and L3 assets.
Final Remarks
One of the main contributions of this paper is to illustrate the usefulness of interpretable corporate governance indices. We develop an index of management insulation from shareholder pressure, which we call the management insulation index (MII). The MII is an 16 Existing research suggests that the Level-3 assets variable contains useful information. Riedl and Sarafeim (2011) consider level-three assets as a proxy for information risk. Lev and Zhou (2009) find that investors have a strong adverse reaction to liquidity constraining events as a function of a bank's level-two and level three assets.
attempt to answer the question of how core corporate law rules make it more or less difficult and time-consuming to replace incumbent management. We show that this index contains information that is useful for predicting bank bailouts during the crisis. Going forward, we note that the methodology that we develop to construct the index is not specific to financial firms. This methodology may prove useful in future studies on the costs and benefits of shareholder empowerment.
The results presented in the paper suggest that banks whose managers enjoyed a higher degree of insulation from shareholder pressure were less reliant on state bailouts than banks whose managers were subject to stronger shareholder rights. One explanation of these results could be that banks that were poorly governed as a result of weaker shareholder discipline may have elected not to participate in the CPP, in order to avoid the restrictions imposed by it and in particular the restrictions placed on executive compensation. The data provide only weak support for such an explanation, although we cannot rule it out. Overall, the evidence in this paper is consistent with the hypothesis that banks in which managers enjoyed a higher degree of insulation from shareholder pressure were more able to survive without government support.
We posit that an explanation can be found in the relationship between bank scope, shareholder pressure, and governance arrangements. Bank shareholders may have incentives to increase risk taking beyond the socially-optimal level. There are two reasons for this. First, the well-known risk-shifting incentives that create conflicts between creditors and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). In an efficient debt market, the debt holder will require an increased return or contractual safeguards to compensate him for the increase in the risk of default. However, in this regard banks and financial institutions are fundamentally different from non-financial corporations. Although sophisticated debt providers may be capable of incorporating variation in the risk profile of banks into the price of their credit, there might be no reason for them to do so. Sovereigns provide explicit and implicit guarantees to bank lenders. The explicit guarantees typically take the form of deposit insurance up to a pre-specified amount of deposits (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002)).
Second, these implicit and explicit state guarantees also have direct positive spill-over effects for equity holders (Kelly, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh 2012).
It is thus possible that, in search for higher returns, bank shareholders had incentives to push their banks towards less traditional banking activities. Such a push may have encountered some resistance from bank managers. A bank manager's human capital, reputational capital, private benefits of control, and financial capital are typically highly undiversified. An increase in the risk profile of the bank results in an increase in the probability of losses for the manager in all of these capital categories, but particularly the first three categories which cannot be diversified at all.
Accordingly, shareholders with strong incentives to pursue high-yield activities may face managers who have a preference for more traditional banking activities. Shareholders who cannot successfully persuade or incentivize managers to alter the bank's strategy may resort to more forceful persuasion: they may threaten managers with removal or loss of control if they fail to implement the shareholders' preferred investment policy. The extent to which any such threat is a credible one is a function of the basic corporate law rules governing a bank, and the extent to which such rules enable an active investor to take control of the bank away from those managers. We would thus expect banks with a low MII score to adopt more aggressive investment strategies, and to be more likely to fail than banks with a high MII score. 
Table I -Management Insulation Scores 2003-2007
This table shows the number of US commercial banks in each of the six management insulation scores described in Figure 1 . Sample size (276) This table shows cross-sectional average values per year of the management insulation index (MII), the management insulation dummy (MID), and the board classification dummy (BCD). The MII variable classifies each bank into one of the six insulation scores described in Figure 1 and, in more details, in the Appendix. The MID variable equals 1 if MII=5 or MII=6, and zero otherwise. The BCD variable equals 1 if the bank has a classified board and zero otherwise. The sample size is 276 in each year. Corporations with an index value of 6 follow one of two "governance paths". Path 1 (see boxes 1 -2 -4 -8 -10 -MII 6 in Figure 1 above) -The board is classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -the classification is contained in the corporation's charter, meaning that a decision to declassify the board requires board approval; -shareholders are unable to gain control over the board by electing additional directors; -director nomination restriction determines whether the final outcome is MII5 or MII6. Corporations with a board classification in their by-laws also fall into this category if an amendment of the bylaws is subject to board approval (this can be stated in the charter or be a default rule under state corporate law).
Year
Summary Statistics
17
Path 2 (see boxes 1 -2 -4 -5 -7 -8-10 -MII 6 in Figure 1 above) -The board is classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, but in the by-laws; -shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; -following declassification the directors still cannot be removed without cause; -shareholders are unable to gain control over the board by electing additional directors; -director nomination restriction determines whether the final outcome is MII5 or MII6.
Assessment:
The boards of banks with an index value of 6 enjoy the maximum amount of "insulation" from shareholder pressure. The board is classified, meaning that only 17 Where by-laws can be amended by shareholders, but only by supermajority vote, we proceeded as follows: If the supermajority is calculated based on all outstanding shares, we assumed that shareholders will not be able, in effect, to amend the by-laws against the will of the incumbent management. Where only shareholders present at the meeting count, we assumed that supermajority requirements above 66 2/3% (typically 80%) render it effectively impracticable to rely on changes to the corporation's by-laws in order to gain control over the board.
a third of the directors stand for re-election each year. Thus, it takes shareholders about two years (two meetings) to reverse the corporation's strategy by gaining control over the board.
We ignore special meeting rights for MII-5 and MII-6 banks: Shareholders can neither remove directors, nor add a relevant number of directors or declassify the board in a special meeting. Hence, we deem the existence of such a right to be irrelevant.
As for restrictions to nominate directors: 18 Such restrictions can limit the effectiveness of a proxy fight by giving the board enough time to react to activist shareholders. We note, however, that this is likely to be less relevant in MII-5 and MII-6 banks, since management is always secure for at least the time until the second-next general meeting, effectively always allowing for sufficient "response time". Such provisions can result in a prolonged period of insulation even for classified boards, particularly where an activist period commences before an annual general meeting but after the advanced notice cut-off date.
Index value Explanation 5
Banks with an index value of 5 are effectively a variation of MII-6 banks. They follow the same two "governance paths", but there are no significant director nomination restrictions in place. Assessment:
The absence of director nomination restrictions arguably slightly reduces the costs of gaining control over the board when compared to MII-6 banks. On the effect of such provisions on the difference in insulation between MII-5 and MII-6 banks see the MII-6 assessment above.
4
Corporations with an index value of 4 follow one of seven "governance paths". Path 1 (see boxes 1 -3 -6 -9 -11 -MII 4 ) -The board is not classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -but shareholders are able to gain control over the board by electing additional directors; -shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; 19 18 We define director nomination restrictions as legal arrangements that require more than 90 days advance notice for the nomination of directors by shareholders (and any rule more burdensome than this).
-The board is not classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -shareholders are unable to gain control over the board by electing additional directors; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Path 3 (see boxes 1 -3 -9 -11-MII 4 ) -The board is not classified; -shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; -shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Path 4 (see boxes 1 -2 -9 -11-MII 4 ) -The board is classified; -nevertheless, shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; -shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Path 5 (see boxes 1 -2 -4 -5 -7 -9 -11-MII 4 ) -The board is classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, but in the by-laws; -shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; -the directors can now be removed without cause and are removed in the same meeting (presuming notice of removal has been given in accordance with the advanced notice bylaws); -shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Path 6 (see boxes 1 -2 -4 -5 -7 -8 -9 -11-MII 4 ) -The board is classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter but in the by-laws; -shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; -the directors cannot now be removed without cause; -shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; -shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Path 7 (see boxes 1 -2 -4 -8 -9 -11 -MII 4 ) -The board is classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -the classification of the board is contained in the corporate charter; -shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; -shareholders have no right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place.
Assessment:
Banks with a MII value of 4 differ significantly from MII-6 banks. Even though the board may be classified (Paths 4-7), shareholders can effectively gain control over the board within a year. As Path 4 shows, even where the board is classified it is possible that shareholders retain the right to remove directors without cause. This renders the board classification irrelevant. Even without such a removal right, some corporations provide for classified boards in their by-laws only, and allow their shareholders to amend the relevant provisions. This means that shareholders can simply declassify the board, rendering the insulation typically offered by staggered boards irrelevant where declassification results in the application of a without cause removal right (see Path 5). Note, however, that the declassification in itself does not typically affect the term of the incumbent directors. 20 Furthermore, even where shareholders cannot remove directors without cause or declassify the board against the will of the management, shareholders are sometimes able to increase board size so as to outnumber the incumbent directors (Path 6 and 7). These three sets of 20 In some States, for example New York and Texas the statute clarifies that a director's term of appointment is the term s/he was appointed for. § 703 New York Business Corporation Law provides for example that "each director shall hold office until the expiration of the term for which he is elected". In other jurisdictions, for example Delaware, the statute is unclear as to the effects of declassification on the director's term where that director was originally appointed for a three year term under a classified board structure. A case could be made that declassification alters the directors term (from three years to annual election), however, similarly a case could be made that the term is the term for which he/she was elected (i.e., for three years). The courts have not addressed this issue although the arguments made by the litigants in one case (Roven v Cotter 547 A.2d 603) assume the continued application of the three year term (in Delaware the issue is unlikely to be litigated given the application of a without cause removal right following declassification). Similar problems arise in other States that do not take the New York approach. On balance we think in the States that do not take the New York approach the argument for the continued applicability of the original (three year) term is the better position, although with respect to some States the answer may also depend on the exact wording of the relevant bylaws. The issue has similarly not been addressed in other States' case law. For our purposes this is relevant in only one context where: (i) classification is in the by-laws; (ii) following declassification the removal right remains a with cause removal right; and (iii) the bank's articles or bylaws allow the shareholders to call an interim meeting. If courts in States that do not take the New York approach were to provide that declassification reduces a three year term to annual election at the annual general meeting then even in banks that, post-declassification, have a with cause removal right control could be obtained within a year by: (i) calling an interim meeting to declassify; and (ii) at the following annual general meeting removing the whole board. If, in contrast, the terms are unaffected by declassification then it will take approximately two years to obtain control of the board in these circumstances. Given this uncertainty in relation to States that do not take the New York approach we have elected to take the position that terms are unaffected by declassification in all States for the purposes of the Management Insulation Index. Importantly, for the purposes of our results taking the opposite view (that declassification results in annual election) does not affect the MID score of any bank in our sample. Any future use of the MII would however want to take this point into account. governance provisions result in a level of entrenchment equivalent to some banks with unclassified boards and without cause removal rights (Path 3).
3
Banks with an index value of 3 are effectively a variation of MII-4 banks. They follow the same seven "governance paths", but there are no significant director nomination restrictions in place. Assessment: Activist shareholders have to wait until the next general meeting to gain board control (see above). The absence of director nomination restrictions arguably slightly reduces the costs of gaining control over the board when compared to MII-4 banks.
2
Banks with an index value of 2 follow one of six different "governance paths". Path 1 (see boxes 1 -2 -9 -12 -MII 2 ) -The board is classified; -nevertheless, shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; -shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Path 2 (see boxes 1 -2 -4 -5 -7 -9 -12-MII 2 ) -The board is classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, but in the by-laws; -shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; -The directors can now be removed without cause; -shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Path 3 (see boxes 1 -2 -4 -5 -7 -8 -9 -12-MII 2 ) -The board is classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -the classification of the board is not contained in the corporate charter, but in the by-laws; -shareholders can amend the by-laws to declassify the board; -the directors cannot following declassification be removed without cause; -shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; -shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Path 4 (see boxes 1 -2 -4 -8 -9 -12-MII 2) -The board is classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -the classification of the board is contained in the corporate charter; -shareholders can, however, increase the size of the board to gain control; -shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place.
Path 5 (see boxes 1 -3 -9 -12-MII 2) -The board is not classified; -shareholders have the right to remove directors without cause; -shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Path 6 (see boxes 1 -3 -6 -9 -12-MII 2) -The board is not classified; -shareholders have no right to remove directors without cause; -shareholders can gain control over the board by increasing the size of the board; -shareholders have the right to call a special meeting; -there are some director nomination restrictions in place. Assessment: As with MII-4 banks, an MII value of 2 can be the result of very different looking governance arrangements. As we can see in Paths 1-4, even where the board is classified it is possible that shareholders can gain control over the board almost immediately. In Paths 1 and 2, the combination of special meeting rights and the ability to declassify the board or remove directors without cause renders the board classification irrelevant for entrenchment. Paths 3 and 4 describe a situation where shareholders of a corporation with a classified board can gain control via an increase of board size. These three sets of governance provisions result in a level of entrenchment equivalent to banks with unclassified boards, without cause removal rights, and without cause removal rights (Path 5). Even where no without cause removal right exists, shareholders can gain control over unclassified corporate boards before the next general meeting where they can increase board size in a special meeting (Path 6). Thus, the connecting characteristic of all MII-2 banks is the ability of shareholders to obtain control at a special meeting. Director nomination restrictions may slightly increase managerial insulation.
1
Banks with an index value of 1 are effectively a variation of MII-2 banks. They follow the same six "governance paths", but there are no significant director nomination restrictions in place. Assessment: Activist shareholders can in principle gain control over the board almost immediately, as they are able to call a special meeting (see above). The absence of director nomination restrictions arguably slightly reduces the costs of gaining control over the board when compared to MII-2 banks.
